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She Had a Name That God Didn’t Give Her: 
Thinking the Body through Atheistic Black Radical 
Feminism
Marquis Bey, Cornell University
Abstract: The article attempts to demonstrate the necessity of acknowledging the body when considering 
the current Black Lives Matter movement, give an account of Black female and trans erasure, and ultimately 
(re)affirm the lived embodiment of Black, female, and trans bodies, all through an atheistic lens. Atheism 
here, while indeed denying the existence of gods, has as its primary concern affirming life. Too often is 
theology, as theologian Anthony Pinn says, “a theology of no-body”; thus atheistic feminist Blackness, as 
understood here, seeks to entrench the body rather than abstract it. Atheistic feminist Blackness reinscribes 
and affirms the subjectivity and humanity of Black, female, and trans bodies, countering hegemonic 
discourse that explicitly and implicitly states otherwise. The article’s emphasis of an atheistic posture stems 
from the prescient words of Catherine Keller: “atheist or agnostic feminists ignore the God-word at their 
own peril.” Therefore, the Black feminist ideological argument takes the “God-word” seriously, reckons 
with it, and offers an alternative to a theological tradition that often imbues the body with inherent flaw 
(sin), abstraction (soul), and erasure of the ontological value of Black, female, and noncisgendered bodies.
Keywords: atheism, radical feminism, Blackness, embodiment, Black Lives Matter
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Everything I say about survival as a complication of the opposition life/death proceeds in me from an 
unconditional affirmation of life…. It is the affirmation of a living being who prefers living, and thus surviving, 
to death, because survival is not simply that which remains but the most intense life possible.
— Jacques Derrida, Learning to Live Finally
Here in this place, we flesh; flesh that weeps, laughs; flesh that dances on bare feet in grass. Love it, love it 
hard. Yonder they do not love your flesh.
— Toni Morrison, Beloved
It is clear from the numerous Black religious leaders, countless Black churches lining streets all over the 
country, historical documents, and statistical data that African American culture is permeated by religion. 
Belief in god1 has often been the backbone keeping a brutalized people standing upright. Religious devotion 
was, especially for Black women “whose spirituality was so intense, so deep, so unconscious, that they were 
themselves unaware of the richness they held,” a constitutive aspect of their Blackness, their womanness 
(Alice Walker, “In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens”; quoted in Rich 2007, 30). But I seek to extricate a 
purported inherent religiosity from Blackness via my own Black feminist lens; I seek to critique James 
Baldwin’s claim that “It is axiomatic that the Negro is religious, which is to say that he [sic] stands in 
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fear of the God our ancestors gave us and before whom we all tremble yet” (1968, 54). What happens, I 
address throughout the argument of this essay, when “the Negro” is not axiomatically religious? Further, 
what happens when that Negro—normalized by Baldwin and numerous others as “he”—maintains a radical 
feminist posture in the world?
The assumption of an axiomatic link between religion and Blackness limits and essentializes Blackness 
and lends itself to the imposition of “not Black enough” on those African Americans who, like myself, 
identify as atheist. Blackness is arguably “Blackened” by departing from and moving beyond Christianity, 
by which I mean that the hegemonic tenets delimiting a kind of “authentic” Blackness are rebelled against, 
refused, fugitively eluded. Because of the strong historical connection between Blackness and religiosity, 
the Black embodiment of Christian religiosity holds power in producing knowledge of Black bodies as they 
relate to religion. In light of this, the epistemological framework of my feminist Blackness is, as Donovan 
O. Shaefer notes, “not just about gender, but the way that embodied power relations are embedded in the 
production of knowledge” (2014, 375). Grounding my critique in this epistemology, I seek to imbue the 
discourse of Blackness and feminism with a humanity that is not predicated on a belief in the existence 
of god(s). My goal is to address pressing issues that are of concern for Black/feminists without the use of 
theological language, a language often mired in a history of oppression of Black communities and women 
and trans folks. By removing theological language from the social-justice work of this essay I elude the 
trap of being tied to a doctrine that invalidates the lives of women and especially gender-nonconforming 
people, and which has historically been used to invalidate the ontological integrity of all Black people. By 
removing social justice’s perceived default link to religiosity, it is then possible to more readily validate the 
existence of Black people, women, and/or trans folks, considering how Christianity has served as a “sacred 
canopy” for certain inequitable power relations. This atheistic perspective has values much in line with 
those described as humanistic, according to Black humanist Norm Allen, Jr., in that atheism is structured 
around “a belief in reason, science, democracy, openness to new ideas, the cultivation of moral excellence, 
a commitment to justice and fairness, and a belief in the inherent worth of humanity…. [H]umanity—not 
divinity—is the primary concern of humanists” (Allen 1991, 10; emphasis added).
This essay will also join the small, but growing, number of studies engaging the conversations on Black/
feminist atheism, and will help to theorize an alternative connection between Blackness, feminism, and 
Christianity. In this vein, I will focus almost solely on Christianity—although my critiques can readily apply 
to other monotheistic religions—not because it is more important per se but because of the vast Christian 
population in the African American racial category and female gender category, the Christian faith claiming 
88 percent of all African Americans (85 percent of whom say their religion is very important to them) and 
82 percent of all adult US women. The most religious demographic, then, are Black women, 91 percent of 
whom are religiously affiliated (Pew Research Center 2008; Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2009; 
Dean 2014, 44). 
Throughout the essay it will be implicitly evident that my words are what constitute me; “Language, 
incontestably,” as Baldwin eloquently puts it, “reveals the speaker.” Language is fashioned “in order to 
describe and thus control [one’s] circumstances, or in order not to be submerged by a reality that they cannot 
articulate. (And, if they cannot articulate it, they are submerged.)” (Baldwin 1979). So as the constitutive 
force creating me, what I think and the language I use to create my reality is twin skin to my feminist 
Blackness, thus they—my atheism, my feminist Blackness—speak one another in symbiotic co-constitutivity. 
An atheistic Black radical feminist vocabulary is a necessity as it allows me to inhabit a language in which I 
can dwell, and thus a means of speaking my subjectivity and the subjectivity of others who cannot inhabit 
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themselves fully—embody themselves fully—and honestly in theological language. Too often is (Black) 
theology “a theology of no-body, a system of theological expression without an organized (re)presentation 
of the body as body”; because the body is shaped and defined by dynamic power relations, it is, hence, “a 
story told to support the social system” (Pinn 2010, 3; original emphasis). Humanist theologian Anthony 
Pinn places the body at the forefront of his humanist thought, and it is the primacy and consequentialness 
he gives to the body that appeal to me. Pinn writes:
I promote the body as developed and defined by social structures (e.g., discourse) and in this it is not a 
biological reality. I couple this with an understanding of the body as biochemical reality, as biological “stuff” 
that is not captured through abstract references to social mechanism and epistemological structures…. 
Black bodies are material, are real, but what is meant by this and what is known/experienced about this 
body is not possible outside discourse (knowledge) generated in connection to power relationships. I do not 
want to dismiss the discursive body that is currently of concern to black theology but instead combine that 
understanding of the body with solid focus on the physical or material body. (Pinn 2010, 5) 
What theological “no-bodying” does is deprive one of the humanity that structures our very being-in-the-
world. Our subjectivity is gained, in large part, by our being-in-the-world as embodied humans, so for a 
theology to abstract us and in many ways devalue our embodiment consequently devalues the core of our 
subjectivity. Christian theology is often what Baldwin says of protest novels: It is a “theology that denies 
[us] life”; it is a “rejection of life, the human being, the denial of his [sic] beauty, dread, power…” (1968, 
17). Atheistic Black radical feminism operates via entrenchment rather than theological abstraction; it 
emphasizes and validates the embodied life.
It is the reality of my lived Black feminist body that has driven me to my intellectual, ideological, and 
theological position. My body matters. Indeed, it is the mark of a feminist epistemology: “Poststructuralist 
feminist atheism takes seriously the embodiment of belief and disbelief” (Schaefer 2014, 383). I intend for 
my Black embodiment to be permitted to speak my atheism; for my feminism to speak my Blackness; for 
my atheism to speak my feminism. They exist with and through each other.
Satanic Feminist Blackness
It is imperative first that I do some “fessing up.” With the abovementioned importance of embodied 
knowledge, as a cisgendered male, my embodiment is always complicit to an extent in male supremacy. 
My corporeality always has the potential to appear hostile because of the hegemonic and violent legacy my 
embodiment carries with it. That I must own. As standpoint theory argues, my social status matters and 
affects how I interpret the world, since indeed I interpret the world through my body, a body that is coded 
as male. I cannot speak from experiential authority on women or trans folk, so it is important that this 
limitation is made clear. 
And further still, I must also admit that my atheism is in many ways a luxury. I am not in such horrendous 
social conditions where my only salvation would seem to be belief in a great by and by, or the belief that 
there is someone eternal that loves me unconditionally. Enslaved Black bodies in large part could not 
fathom living without the presence of god, for their terrestrial conditions were so rough their hope came 
largely from belief in heaven. That I do not feel that necessity marks a luxury that many of my racial kin did 
not have, and I also must own and acknowledge this.
In the religious realm of Christianity, its doctrines and institutions cannot shake their historically 
constitutive past. Indeed, as cultural theorist Stuart Hall says, an identity is the “the [name] we give to the 
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different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past” (Hall 1990, 
225). The identity of Christianity and its components are dependent upon its past, a past that is deeply 
racist and sexist. As such, the constitutive elements of Christianity do not jive with my feminist or Black 
ideological mindsets. Therefore, because of the racist and sexist histories of Christianity, and because my 
Blackness and my feminism are large components of my identity, my Black feminism urges my atheism. In 
other words, I reject Christianity in particular, and religions in general, because they have done, and still do, 
a kind of violence to two of my identities to which I hold dear. I wish to make explicit, however, that Black 
feminist atheism does not advocate the persecution of theists; feminism, fugitive Blackness (defined below), 
and my atheism are by definition opposed to all persecution and affirm life, the antithesis of persecution 
(Winter 2001, 55). The goal of Black feminist atheism is to promote the recognition of the historical and 
contemporary racist and sexist discourses that are legitimated and perpetuated by an epistemology that 
takes god as given. 
But the god concept not only legitimates racist and sexist discourses, it renders such discourse beyond 
criticism. As atheism scholar Michael Lackey has noted, “God’s objective is to secure order; He [sic] is the 
basis and foundation of the political, economic, and legal system of the United States of America. To oppose 
the political, economic, or legal system, therefore, is to oppose God” (Lackey 2007, 107). To challenge 
patriarchy is not to call into question the authority of men; it is to question god godself. To challenge 
whiteness is not to call into question the legitimacy of white institutions; it is to question god godself. 
And god is the ultimate form of whiteness. God is a transcendental signifier, a signifier that is unmarred 
and normative. God is a proxy for whiteness insofar as god is a hegemonic governing force that seeks to 
“fix” unruly acts and identities in place under god’s rule. This is evident also in images of Jesus, who was 
fashioned over time to sanction whiteness. “By wrapping itself with the alleged form of Jesus,” write Edward 
J. Blum and Paul Harvey, “whiteness gave itself a holy face. [It] create[d] the perception that whiteness was 
sacred and everlasting. With Jesus as white, Americans could feel that sacred whiteness stretched back in 
time thousands of years and forward in sacred space to heaven and the second coming” (Blum and Harvey 
2012, 8). Thus, to challenge the white patriarchal establishment “is to be a renegade angel, a Lucifer who 
must be cast into perdition” (Lackey 2007, 107). 
So I will cast myself into perdition. I will take an imaginatively historical and etymological leap, since 
my atheism stems from my Blackness, and construct an atheistic feminist Blackness that is Satanic. “Satan” 
derives from the Hebrew word ṣāṭān, which means “adversary, one who plots against another.” The Devil’s 
other name, Lucifer, comes from the Latin lūcifer, an adjective meaning “light-bringing” (Oxford English 
Dictionary). If we understand Blackness, as Stefano Harney and Fred Moten argue it, as the “dismissal of 
any possible claim regarding the essence or even the being of blackness,” and as “in between that impropriety 
of speech that approaches animality and a tendency towards expropriation that approaches criminality,” 
then Blackness is “the black thing that cuts the regulative, governant force of (the) understanding and 
finds itself to be what it is not” (Harney and Moten 2013, 48–50). Blackness becomes a perennially critical 
posture. Drawing on the biography of Satan and Lucifer and synthesizing their etymologies, I conceive of 
Blackness as a kind of Satan/Lucifer-ness, an accusatory, critical, light-bearing adversary of the hegemonic 
forces attempting to govern (control) the unruly. 
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Thinking along similar lines as Harney and Moten, J. Kameron Carter speaks to the fugitivity of Blackness:
[B]lackness is a movement of the between … an interstitial drama on the outskirts of the order of purity. 
It is an improvisatory movement of doubleness, a fugitive announcement in and against the grain of the 
modern world’s ontotheological investment in pure being, or pristine origins, and of the modern world’s 
orchestrations of value, rule, and governance (i.e., sovereignty) in the project or the ongoing exercise of 
inscribing pure being. Blackness is, to invoke Chandler once again, “paraontological.” (Carter 2013, 590)
The prefix “para-” derives from the ancient Greek παρα-, meaning by the side of, beside, hence alongside 
of, by, past, beyond. As a paraontological category, Blackness eludes pure, pristine, primordial ontological 
origins and is characterized by its subversion of this dominant narrative. Wresting Carter’s words from 
their original Christian context, I seek to retool his language, engaging in what Hortense Spillers calls 
“logological refashioning” (2003, 4) to rewrite the meaning of his words for my atheistic aims. I wish to 
push his notion of the “paraontological” past its limit and make (my) Blackness exist on the outskirts of 
ontology—that is, I wish to aver a Blackness that is also theologically fugitive, existing past and beyond 
god, the primordial Creator. Rather than a mere moving “in and against the grain of the modern world’s 
ontotheological investment in pure being,” as Carter says above, I want to fashion a Blackness that moves 
outside of and beyond the grain of any ontotheological investment. This, I think, would be to take Blackness 
beyond its theological limit. It is to Blacken Carter’s paraontological Blackness.
Blackness and feminism take the material body as vital to their goals of white/male supremacist 
dismantling. Bodies are raced and gendered; Black and female/trans bodies are interpellated into existing 
racial and gender categories, and are oppressed and marginalized based on their “legibility” as Black 
and woman/trans. Because of this racial and gendered oppression, their humanity is circumscribed and 
devalued. At base, then, my rejection of the premise of god’s existence rests on a profound affirmation 
of life. As Pinn emphatically asserts, nothing trumps the integrity of life. This requires that we wrestle 
with the struggles in this world and that all gods must be destroyed (Cone and Pinn 2012). My affirmative 
atheistic ideology also mirrors what A. C. Grayling says, that “the argument against religion is an argument 
for the liberation of the human mind” (2014, 7). Too often does something like the doctrine of original 
sin function as a means by which one’s humanity is imbued with an innate flaw. The doctrine “promotes 
the thinking that the human being, if left to her[-through-]his own devices, is unable to be morally good 
without divine intervention or dependence upon God through faith in Jesus” (Fonza 2013, 191).2 Paul’s 
writing to the church in Rome also bears vestiges of the characterization of the body as sinful and evil: “I 
know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is right, but I cannot do it” 
(Rom. 7:18). About Paul, Molly Bassett and Vincent Lloyd say that he “blames his lack of goodness on his 
body, the mass of matter that binds him to this earth and its creature” (Bassett and Lloyd 2015, 11). This is 
the very antithesis of life-affirmation, as Christianity then requires one to see one’s life as incomplete and 
less valuable without belief in god and Jesus. Indeed, “the Bible teaches that we are all wicked in the sight of 
God, for ‘none is righteous, no, not one’ (Rom. 3:10)” (Redmond 2008, 21). It is this denigrated humanness 
that atheistic feminist Blackness attempts to free from the fetters of Christian doctrine. Feminist Blackness, 
to actualize itself fully, must be atheistic. 
If we are to achieve full humanity, which are the precise goals of feminism and fugitive Blackness, then 
an atheistic posture must be assumed. Oppressive forms of patriarchy and racism—as epitomized by the 
Christian doctrine—are predicated on a circumscription of the ontological possibility and humanity of those 
oppressed by such hegemonic systems. This is all the more dire in light of the latest manifestations of 
the narrative of Black criminalization and Black/female ontological invalidation, as I will discuss in the 
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following section. Feminist Blackness offers a remedy to forms of racist and patriarchal oppression. It 
breaks the locks of racism and patriarchy that imprison people of color and noncisgendered people. But 
the added atheism opens the next lock barring our way to freedom; the theological shackles that bar the full 
range of one’s human possibility fall away when we reject god and embrace a life-affirming ideology. This 
is what an atheistic lens of Black feminism adds: a fugitive maneuver that allows for the evasion of being 
governed and controlled—fixed—by Christian doctrine, the warden of which is the ultimate governing force: 
god. 
From the lived, visceral position of my Blackness and my feminism I must fight to make clear that life—
my life—matters. That fight can only be fully actualized, I think, by casting aside the belief in gods and 
courageously confronting the abyss. Truly, to peer into the abyss of unknown futures and embrace that 
unknowingness, positing nothing but that fear of unknowingness is life-affirming in that all that is not 
unknown is the perennial unfolding of the right now. 
“Right Now Jesus Is Saying: ‘I Can’t Breathe’”3 
It is worth pointing out here the necessity of feminist Blackness. The embodiment of Blackness has 
profound (a)theological consequences. Historically, Blackness has signified inherent guilt, innate sin, and 
inner maleficence. Contemporarily, Blackness still signifies that epidermal “confession” of guilt. To be Black 
is to always be guilty of crime. Black bodies “weaponize sidewalks; shoot [them]selves while handcuffed in 
the back of police cars … [are] incarcerated, assaulted, and stopped and frisked for walking, driving, and 
breathing while black” (Sharpe 2014, 61). Citations of Black bodies gunned down for nothing more than the 
purported crime their skin confessed can persist for pages: Tarika Wilson, Rodney King, Sean Bell, Miriam 
Carey, Oscar Grant, Shantel Davis, Amadou Diallo, Nathaniel Jones, Tyisha Miller, Jordan Davis, Trayvon 
Martin, Sharmel Edwards, Ezell Ford, Renisha McBride, John Crawford, Eric Garner, Michael Brown, 
Vonderrit Myers…4 These slain Black victims were all subject to the circumscription of their humanity by 
the insidious white gaze—a manifestation of the transcendental signifier: god—and in the presence of this 
white gaze Black bodies appear “in the form of a sheer exteriority, implying that the Black body ‘shows 
up,’ makes itself known in terms of its Black surface” (Yancy 2008, 21). Under the white gaze, people like 
Garner and Brown are undifferentiated: “All Coons Look Alike to Me,” as the old song goes. Or religiously 
speaking, as one white Mississippi Yazoo Delta planter said, “I think God intended the niggers to be slaves. 
Now since man has deranged God’s plan, I think the best we can do is keep ‘em as near to a state of bondage 
as possible” (Oshinsky 1996, 11).
The interiority of Black bodies undergoes abject erasure and becomes “ontologically mapped,” its 
cartographical coordinates leading “to that which is always immediately visible: the Black surface” 
(Yancy 2008, 21). The body, however, is not merely its materiality. It is never divorced from perception, 
interpretation, and consequently the actions based on those perceptions and interpretations. The body, in 
effect, is a text onto which scripts and meanings are inscribed. Bodies are the ways in which we constitute 
the knowledge of the world. The world appears to us through the body. Contrary to the religious mantra 
“be in the world but not of it,” which is a kind of world denial rooted in greater importance given to divine 
afterlife—as Eldridge Cleaver’s incarcerated context makes clear, “[religionists] could usher you through the 
Pearly Gates after you were dead, but not through the prison gate while you were still alive and kicking” 
(Cleaver 1999, 23; original emphasis)—bodies in the world are how we come to be the various aspects of our 
identities. One cannot be in the world and not of it, as many Christian discourses urge, since it is precisely 
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because we are in the world that we are, and thus our existence and identities as such stem from our worldly 
in-ness. While the placards in protest of Brown’s murder read “Black Lives Matter,” I want to underscore 
that there is no life without the body. That is to say, Black lives can only matter if Black bodies matter first. 
As the philosopher Drew Leder remarks, “we cannot understand the meaning and form of objects without 
reference to the bodily powers through which we engage them…. The lived body is not just one thing in the 
world, but a way in which the world comes to be” (1992, 25). More originary is the body; the body precedes 
the life of that Black body, thus must be deemed important before the life can.
Michael Brown, for instance, is put at war with his body. Extracted from his lived Black embodiment 
by the white gaze and deified by those who sought to use his death as a pseudocrucifixion, Brown in some 
sense was denied his enfleshment. The subtle relegation to a topos ouranios, a fate that has befallen many 
of the (largely male) aforementioned Black people, deemphasizes, in part, the fact that these bodies were 
born into the world, lived as Black, and died because of that fact. Not only was this characteristic accident 
(i.e., their incidental existence as Black-skinned) ontologized, it was done so outside of their Black bodies 
and, after their deaths, repositioned to T-shirts, memes, slogans, and causes. Let me be clear: I am not 
denigrating these efforts by any means. Black lives must be preserved in their deaths. The rise in poems 
and protests and activism in the name of Trayvon Martin and Mike Brown signifies the importance and 
value that Black lives have. What I wish to suggest is that if these victims are not kept in close relation 
with their lived bodily experiences, which exist in a continual chain of other lived Black experiences that 
have succumbed to similar fates, we run the risk of dissolving the body that was of utmost importance to 
their experiences. This kind of martyrdom extracted from the bodies of the martyrs is indicative of specific 
theological ideologies of denying the world, disassociating oneself from one’s flesh (“Our bodies are just 
shells for our souls. The body doesn’t matter,” my white Christian friend George once told me), or imprecise 
renditions of actual people, i.e., demigods and saints.
The atheistic perspective of my proffered Black feminism ensures that this deification does not occur. To 
deify is, quite simply, to dehumanize. As far back as Emmett Till, slain Black bodies often become symbols 
that stretch across time and the entirety of the Black race, deindividuating the lived, particular, embodied 
lives of the victims in an effort to make them Christlike. Mamie Till Mobley, Emmett Till’s mother, wanted 
her son’s death to save other Black boys and men who could have undergone the same fate. This is indeed 
admirable and useful in a period of overt anti-Black vigilantism, but it still makes Till a Christ figure, no 
longer a 14-year-old boy who lived but a symbol—i.e., not a human with a body in the world—who saves 
everyone else through his own nonhumanness: death. Only through abstraction, the taking of “souls,” do 
these Black bodies have value.
We must hold in front of us the corporeal, not the abstracted heavenly afterthoughts of pristine, eulogized 
lives. We must not fall into the pattern of thinking of the dead as angels because, indeed, they were not. 
As “the steel-blue ghost standing at the podium” said, “Vonderrit Myers was no angel.” No, he was not. 
He was human. He “had a name that god didn’t give him” (Bennett 2015). Joshua Bennett’s spoken-word 
poem “Still Life With Black Death” reveals the necessity of refraining from making angels and holy victims 
of murdered Black boys, Vonderrit Myers in particular, a Black 18-year-old killed in St. Louis by a police 
officer. “When he died,” says Bennett,
he did not bleed starlight or gold.  
He was not half-bird.  
The gun spoke, and no flaxen wings shot from each shoulder  
as if to carry him beyond the bullet’s swift assignment—  
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No, the boy was not a pillar of white smoke bright enough to break a nonbeliever,  
make a holy man fall prostrate, heaving, 
heavy with contrition. 
Here, Bennett enacts a profound refusal of making an angel or divine entity of Myers. Myers was not a 
heavenly angel (half-bird), nor did his death cause him to sprout “flaxen wings.” To claim so erases Myers’s 
humanness, his flawed, (Black-)fleshy, embodied vessel, which was the grounds for his murder. In order 
to maintain Myers’s ontological integrity, we cannot erase him by painting him as perfect. He must remain 
“no angel,” i.e., human, flawed. Only here can he be redeemed, because for Vonderrit Myers to be seen as 
himself he must be seen as he was—Black, human, and flawed. No angel.
Bennett also urges listeners to reembody whiteness, unmoor it from its perceived transcendental 
perspective. The goal is not to reverse the statuses and imbue Myers and other Black bodies with holy 
omnipotence and divinity while white officers are condemned, demonized, and incarnated in visible 
white flesh. All must be embodied in themselves. Bennett continues and points to a white epistemology 
of ignorance and all-knowingness, asking, “How else to erase him if they cannot feign omnipotence, / lay 
claim to the sky, colonize heaven…” Indeed, omnipotence, the limits of living (the sky), and the ultimate 
topos ouranios (heaven) are colonized by whiteness. Thus they take on a status of unquestioned normality, 
the standard by which life is measured, and the ideological template structuring the world’s grammar. What 
must occur is the reembodiment of the abstracted whiteness used to “colonize” the heavenly, standardizing 
realms. Bennett does so by revealing the mundane humanness of Myers’s killer, a proxy for a murderous 
white gaze that truncates the subjectivity of Black bodies:
That killer woke up today,  
probably ate scrambled eggs for breakfast,   
brushed his teeth three times or fewer,   
walked in soft slippers…  
Checked the mail while a child decomposed underground.
Making an (a)theological shift, even though several historically Black denominations called for a “Black 
Lives Matter” Sunday, it is striking that a majority of churches were, for the most part, relatively silent 
on the matter.5 Professor of theology Brian Bantum asked poignant questions: “If theology does anything 
should it not at least speak to the realities that mark our lives together as human beings? And if this is the 
case, how can theology that confesses who God is, not also acknowledge the bodies that confess?” Bantum’s 
focus on the body’s importance is estimable. Theology must not only attend to the body but, I would add, 
must also hold the body accountable. This, I think, is where Bantum misses the mark:
To do theology faithfully, confessionally, we must see how Christianity participates in the social realities of 
a broken world. We must acknowledge and confess the ways we fail to see ourselves, the world, and Christ 
faithfully. But we must also confess that in our blindness the eternal Word has come nonetheless. We must 
confess that we are like the blind who have been made to see, even if in our sight we do not yet understand the 
images that are before us. In this disorientation of a world that seems more familiar when we close our eyes 
and return to our broken state of blindness, hoping to regain a familiarity of a world filled only with touch and 
sound, we must have the courage to keep our eyes open. We must learn to hear anew in the encounter with 
faces and bodies. In a way, we must be born anew again and again. (Bantum 2014; original emphasis)
Kudos to Bantum for shedding a prophetic light on the responsibility of Christianity. That he concedes that 
Christianity participates in social ills is a theological move that must become more widespread. That he also 
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acknowledges the failures of Christians keeps the church accountable not only for its good deeds but also 
for its less-than-adequate efforts at times. But Bantum slips into an evasiveness. 
Admitting that “we’re blind and not living confessionally and prophetically,” which is true in the context 
of Christian thought, seems to also absolve god and Jesus of any responsibility. It is very common to attribute 
positive “blessings” in the world to god: good fortune bestowed upon the church in the form of money or 
larger venues, narrowly escaping a deadly car crash, or acing your calculus exam. But deities seem to be 
absolved of responsibility for misfortunes, and in fact justified by way of a mysterious plan that subsumes 
and puts a positive spin on the horrible event. This, however, is no new critique of theism. Atheists and 
freethinkers have leveled this critique countless times, and I do not intend to proffer it as novel. My intention 
from a standpoint that is Black and feminist and atheistic is to reveal the implications and consequences 
of such evasive thinking. Purportedly showing how believers can remedy the horrors of the world like the 
murder of Mike Brown, rather than not letting it happen in the first place, eschews the importance that 
would serve better being placed on preventative measures, and also fails, I think, to link Brown’s death with 
numerous similar historical events that were also not stopped, and thus becomes complicit in providing 
sanctioned precedent for the continuance of the criminalization of Black bodies. In other words, focusing on 
bearing honest witness to the troubles of the world and discussing how best to address and protest Brown’s 
killing—which, to be sure, are incredibly admirable actions that should be continued—deemphasizes the 
more desired outcome of the living body of Mike Brown. It also fails to adequately place Brown’s murder 
in a long chain of slain Black bodies killed on the basis of criminalized scripts imposed upon them, which 
potentially frames contemporary incidents as isolated. Mike Brown, in other words, was by no means the 
first and, unfortunately, not the last to be killed by white hands (or guns) on the basis of the signified 
meaning of his Blackness. In short, rather than holding god accountable for the numerous unjust murders 
of Black people in the practice’s centuries-long history, historical precedents are elided and the hot new 
murder is treated in a vacuum, god once again not being forced to bear the responsibility for, in part, 
enabling the historical struggle of Black people living under the murderous gaze of militarized whiteness. 
God does not value the embodied lives of Black people, as they only become divinely valid through death. 
God is one who does not make us “larger, freer, and more loving,” so, by Baldwin’s logic, “it is time we got 
rid of Him [sic]” (1993, 47). And this captures what is meant by atheistic feminist Blackness.
So what would it mean to “Blacken” god, to make god and Jesus “Black like me”? What might happen 
if god or Jesus were to become incarnate in the world through the suffering of Black bodies? What would 
it mean, as this section’s heading asks, for Jesus to be unable to breathe? Jesus, in effect, is suffocating 
just like the asthmatic Eric Garner who was put in an (illegal) chokehold by police officers and killed as 
a result. As one Twitter commenter said, “A state that can choke a man to death, on video, for selling 
cigarettes is NOT Rom. 13 justice” (Rom. 13:1–2: “1Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For 
there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. 2Whosoever therefore resisteth the 
power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation”). Rev. 
Jeff Hood made this comment: “I keep thinking about Eric Garner saying, ‘I can’t breathe.’ It made me 
think—that’s what Jesus is saying in this culture. Jesus is fundamentally connected to the marginalized 
and right now Jesus is saying, ‘I can’t breathe’” (Kuruvilla and Blumberg 2014). Jesus here is mortalized, 
returned to his body, Blackened, and made in the image of Eric Garner, a reversal of the originary divine 
god-like fashioning of humanity. The move has atheological resonances—god and Jesus must die; hence 
they must become mortal if they are to exist, they must suffocate. And with god dead, we have atheism. One 
can say that god is this suffocation precisely because god is deemed immortal—god is death, the antithesis 
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of mortality and finitude. God’s supposed immortality is inseparable from absolute immortality. In bringing 
Jesus to mortality through Garner, Rev. Hood’s remark attempts to kill god. Indeed, he must die if he is to 
be able to be seen in likeness to Garner and other Black bodies. The affirmation of life, the crux of atheistic 
feminist Blackness, entails the affirmation of mortality. It values bodily being. Consequently, affirming life 
and mortality—the condition of life—means denouncing immortality, denouncing death—god godself. To 
paraphrase Langston Hughes’s poem “Dear Lovely Death,” “Dear lovely Death, [god] is thy other name.”6 
With this affirmation of Black life inevitably comes fear. Philosopher Jacques Derrida reminds us that 
the “unconditional affirmation of life,” in which “survival is the most intense life possible,” is filled with 
pain and fear precisely because of one’s decision to live; life rests on the condition of its own eradication 
around every corner (quoted in Hägglund 2008, 34). For Black bodies, however, that fear is intensified, 
heightened because of the way that Black bodies are “seen” as perpetually and inherently criminal, gazed 
upon not as themselves but as static racial molds that exist ahead of themselves in the white gaze. But this 
is a negation of Black life since Black lives cannot be affirmed in and of themselves; their ontological value 
is circumscribed. So in order to affirm all lives, especially Black lives, they must first exist for themselves 
rather than as fixed images in the hegemonic purview. This is even more the case with female and trans 
bodies.
Radical Feminism
Catherine Keller articulates such insight when she says that “atheist or agnostic feminists ignore the God-
word at their own peril,” meaning that atheists and agnostics should not lightly discard god as important 
and a force to be reckoned within Western culture (Keller 2000, 228). The concept of god holds tremendous 
power in our culture, and it would be unwise to believe otherwise. Because of this power, the god concept 
must be diligently scrutinized, put under the interrogative light of criticism, and struggled with. The nature 
of that critical and interrogative posture, for me, is one deeply rooted in feminist Blackness.
The primary goal of feminism, from my perspective, is to end sexism, exploitation, and oppression. In 
this vein, those bodies that are most subject to oppression are female and trans bodies of color. As such, 
feminism seeks to empower these bodies—to dismantle the heteropatriarchal strictures that circumscribe 
their embodied movement and to allow them full subjectivity and autonomy uninhibited by hegemonic 
forces. In many ways, this requires a rejection of traditional religiosity, as the Bible, for example, is a 
patriarchal book that is markedly condemnatory of female bodies and autonomy, antiquated (considering 
its so-called timelessness) in its advocacy regarding the multiplicity of gender expression, and used to 
invalidate the ontological existence of those bodies—namely, trans and female—that fall outside of its 
extremely outdated ideologies.
Interestingly, a radical atheistic Black feminist ideological stance is in many ways prophetic. The word 
“prophetic” holds religious connotation, of course, but by definition a prophet is a radical social critic, 
one who exists outside of the normative ideological milieu and lays a trenchant critique of the prevailing 
power structure—precisely where a feminist atheist falls. To be prophetic, in many ways, is to be fugitive. 
As prophetic, feminism must deliver constant critique of social structures. In line with this essay’s central 
theme of embodiment, feminism here will be articulated as prophetic and fugitive as it relates to particular 
bodies that are subject to gendered oppression and its (a)theological implications.
One might note the similarities in the values of atheistic Black radical feminism and, say, Womanist 
theology. Womanist theologians have done a phenomenal job of critiquing the sexism and androcentrism 
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of traditional Black liberation theology, and centering the lives and experiences of Black women, who went 
largely unmentioned in the male-oriented Black liberation theology. In large part, atheistic Black radical 
feminism advocates for much of what Womanist theology does, namely, as Monica Coleman (2008) outlines 
through her notion of “making a way out of no way,” radical possibility, human autonomy, social justice 
and individual well-being, and disruption and confrontation of existing order. But what differentiates 
atheistic Black radical feminism is its rejection of the structuring and governing—and thus limiting of 
human agency—force of god. (Coleman notes that radical possibility, for example, stems from god’s radical 
openness and possibility. Unforeseen possibilities, she says unwaveringly, “come from God.”) Womanist 
theology’s commitment to Black feminist aims is to be championed and supported, of course, but the fact 
that it is still mired in the language of god and avers that to “the extent that we use our freedom to diverge 
from God’s calling, there is evil in the world” demonizes human agency and is not really radical possibility 
(Coleman 2008, 33, 54). Such stance is still confined, which stifles the fugitivity that characterizes this 
essay’s conception of Black feminism. One could say, then, that atheistic Black radical feminism—delivering 
on its radical fugitivity—does present “a challenge to the existing order”: It challenges, quite vociferously, 
the existing order of god.
Critiquing the largely androcentric Black Lives Matter movement, I want to examine the ways that Black 
women and trans folks have been systematically erased from the discourse of violence against Black bodies 
and how atheism can supplement or justly speak to this erasure. Black women and girls who are slain by 
white police officers are elided from media coverage and thus relegated to a space of nonimportance in 
the social imagination, despite the fact that the very Black Lives Matter movement was started by Patrisse 
Cullors, Alicia Garza, and Opal Tometi—Black queer women. The list of unarmed Black women killed 
ostensibly because of their Blackness is just as long as that of Black men and boys: Aiyana Jones, 7, killed 
by a Detroit police officer as she slept on her father’s couch; Rekia Boyd, 22, killed by a police officer in 
Chicago; Yvette Smith, 48, who was unarmed when she was killed by a police officer in Texas; Pearlie Smith, 
93, fatally shot in her home; Tarika Wilson, 26, whose one-year-old son was also injured when she was 
killed by a Ohio police officer; Tyisha Miller, 19, killed by a police officer in Los Angeles; Kathryn Johnson, 
92, killed by a police officer in Atlanta; Gabriella Nevarez, 22, killed by a Sacramento police officer; Eleanor 
Bumpurs, 66, killed by a police officer in the Bronx (Dionne 2014). But few of these women’s deaths have 
incited protest.
That these women’s killings go largely untelevised or talked about bespeaks how women’s bodies, especially 
Black women’s bodies, are valued less than male bodies. Indeed, police violence and brutality are often 
coded as male. Because they frequently exist as caricatures that cast them as seductresses, hypersexualized, 
“bitches,” and sexually immoral (the classic minstrel figures of Sapphire and Jezebel), Black female bodies 
are deprived of the innocence culturally given to others. Western Christian civilization revolves around 
an unbreakable sacrament of innocence, conferred upon faithful bodies by the blood of Jesus Christ. And 
Jesus’s maleness, as many feminist scholars have noted, is consequential. Some Womanist theologians 
argue that Jesus is a Black woman (metaphorically, in that he is identified with the most oppressed) and 
assert that Jesus saved all, thus making his maleness irrelevant. However, Jesus’s maleness does, in fact, 
still matter. Jesus as a figure has been used not only to give whiteness a divine connection, as many Black 
liberation scholars have noted, but also to promote the divinity of masculinity and manliness, particularly 
after World War I. Jesus as male, while historically accurate, also serves as an imagistic and symbolic 
way to bolster the superiority—the godliness—of a maleness that, since it is hegemonic, operates on the 
subordination of all nonmasculine gender presentations (Blum and Harvey 2012, 167–78). This results in 
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the devaluation of women’s and trans lives, which, contrary to male lives, are not seen as divine, innocent, 
or salvific, as played out in the male-centeredness of much of the Black Lives Matter protest movement.
While it is true that religious belief has spawned revolutions like Nat Turner’s Rebellion and the radical 
politics of mid-twentieth-century civil rights activism, it remains that their revolutionary leadership was 
anomalous, in that people surrounding these religious radicals were largely passive, complicit, and docile. 
It is dangerous when particularly Black, female, and noncisgendered bodies begin to view their afflictions 
as normative, god-willed, and even redemptive. The idea of redemptive suffering has long been proffered 
as a way to validate the quotidian oppressions of Black people, especially Black women. It acted as an 
answer to the difficult questions posed by theodicies and salvaged Black humanity in the face of constant 
suffering. However, redemptive suffering, which is arguably the central theme of the New Testament, 
does more harm (literally) than good. Underlying the mindset of redemptive suffering is the belief that 
suffering without retaliation can transform the sufferer and the oppressor, converting, but not defeating, 
the oppressor’s heart and revealing the love of Christ—“No cross, no crown.” This belief ascribes virtue to 
suffering, stymieing opportunities for sustained activism; it beatifies the harm of oneself, a type of religious 
masochism. Embodied lives matter more than a worn theodicy—a way of explaining the existence of human 
suffering in light of god’s omnibenevolence. This, at base, is what Black liberation theology is: “an extended 
treatment of the theodicy question: What can be said about the justice of God in light of human suffering?” 
(Pinn 2001, 26). In order to love oneself, to love life, it is crucial that redemptive suffering is rejected. Life 
is inextricable from one’s lived experiences, experiences indelibly shaped by the gender and race of one’s 
body. So if Black lives truly matter, redemptive suffering and the religious doctrines on which it is based 
must be jettisoned. 
The notion of redemptive suffering, while deeply problematic, was rarely if ever used to beatify non-
normative bodies that suffered on the basis of their gender nonconformity. If Black liberation theology’s 
use of redemptive suffering was a method by which Black lives were given meaning and value in the face of 
oppression, then Black theology’s silence on the suffering of trans bodies implies their deviation from the net 
of valid, redeemable life. Trans bodies are those that defy traditional categories of gendered embodiment, 
those that exist in varying degrees of liminal space between the binary categories of male and female. To 
be trans is to transition between gender categories thought to be static and mutually exclusive or to in 
many ways embody oneself queerly, that is, in a way that is outside of existing categories or oppositional to 
prevailing gendered categorical ideologies.
Trans bodies are deemed fundamentally invalid, uninhabitable, thus in need of extermination in order 
to preserve the order of things. The breaching of thought-to-be god-given gender binaries (“So God created 
man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them” [Gen. 1:27]) 
is seen as an abnormality of god’s natural order, by extension marring the pristine image of god. To preserve 
god’s purity—indeed, god godself, since to be god necessitates purity—the gendered anomaly cannot live.
In the context of the Black Lives Matter movement, to critique it even further, pulling a maneuver similar 
to Black feminists’ critique of white feminists’ white solipsism—essentially a critique of a critique—it seems 
that all Black lives do not truly matter, considering the veritable erasure of the murders of Black trans 
people. On August 7, 1995, in Washington, DC, Tyra Hunter was a passenger in a vehicle transporting her 
to work. At an intersection, the car was hit, critically injuring Hunter and the driver. By the time firefighters 
arrived, Hunter was pulled from the wreckage, awaiting assistance. Firefighter Adrian Williams and others 
began treating the injured victims, but Williams stopped abruptly when he cut open Hunter’s pant leg 
and noticed she had male genitalia. According to eyewitnesses, Williams stood up, terrified, and backed 
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away from the semiconscious Hunter, who was writhing in pain and gasping for breath, unable to breathe. 
Williams was quoted by one witness as saying, “This bitch ain’t no girl… It’s a nigger, he got a dick.” Another 
witness heard another firefighter say, “Look, it’s got a cock and balls.” The firefighters—America’s heroes—
stood making derisive, transphobic “jokes” while Hunter’s life-saving treatment went unaddressed. After 
some time, other firefighters attended to Hunter’s injuries, and she was transported to DC General Hospital, 
where she was placed under the care of Dr. Joseph A. Bastien, who failed to provide a necessary blood 
transfusion or insert a chest tube necessary for Hunter’s medical care. Later that day, she was pronounced 
dead (Snorton and Haritaworn 2013, 69).
Of course, this “treatment” is not uncharacteristic. Though most of the transgender discourse would 
interpret this event as representing a case of medicalized transphobia—which of course it does—there is 
a broader politico-theoretical framework that can read Hunter’s ill-treatment as a site where the subjects 
and medical practitioners enacted what Henry Giroux calls a “biopolitics of disposability” toward Hunter’s 
“illegible” trans body, a “new kind of politics … in which entire populations are now considered disposable, 
an unnecessary burden on state coffers, and cosigned to fend for themselves” (Giroux 2006, 174). Thus,
neoliberal ideologies provide biopower with new ammunition in the creation of life-enhancing and death-
making worlds, and offer an insidious addendum to rationales for population control. The consequence of 
this logic effaces the way power and life are maintained and reproduced through the deaths of certain others. 
(Juang 2006; see also Levi, n.d., 1; Snorton and Haritaworn 2013, 69) 
Through this scenario, white/cisgendered/male life was buttressed and held up as archetypally valid by way 
of the disposability and invalidity of Hunter’s Black/trans/female-presenting (save for the “cock and balls”) 
body. Furthermore, and this relates directly to the theological, Hunter’s mother, Margie, referring to Tyra 
as her son Tyrone, which undoubtedly allowed for greater sympathy via the male embodiment implicit in 
protests combating violence against Black life, told Washington Post reporters that “Tyrone always was so 
sure he would be famous, that he’d be on the television. I don’t think he meant this way. I know I didn’t. 
But maybe this is God’s will and something good will come of it” (Slevin 1998). Margie Hunter presents the 
possibility that god orchestrated Tyra Hunter’s death, thus condoning the loss of life—divinely sanctioning 
the non-mattering of trans life—because of its perceived utility in promoting the good of others’ lives. God 
is invoked as sanctioning the death-by-transphobia because of its use in validating other lives, one’s own 
Black trans life not being valuable in and of itself, only as it validates other lives by way of its own invalidity. 
Here, Tyra Hunter’s embodied life is fashioned, via god, as a nonlife that serves only to promote a nebulous 
good for lives that are not itself.
And this is no isolated or outdated incident. Coko Williams was found dead by gunshot and cut throat 
in Detroit on April 4, 2012; Evon Young was tortured and murdered by five men in 2013; Kandy Hall 
was found dead due to massive bodily trauma by an unknown object in 2014; Yaz’min Shancez was found 
dead behind a garbage bin in Fort Myers, Florida, and burned postmortem in 2014; Aniyah Parker was 
murdered in a “robbery gone wrong” in 2014, though police say the murder was motivated by Parker’s being 
transgender; Penny Proud was murdered in 2015; and London Chanel was fatally stabbed in the back and 
neck by Raheam Felton, who was the boyfriend of one of her roommates; among numerous others.
Trans bodies are also subject to religious legal circumscription. During the 2014 Southern Baptist 
Convention, the official document “On Transgender Identity” had this to say regarding trans people:
WHEREAS, Distinctions in masculine and feminine roles as ordained by God are part of the created order and 
should find expression in every human heart (Genesis 2:18, 21–24; 1 Corinthians 11:7–9; Ephesians 5:22–33; 
1 Timothy 2:12–14); and
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WHEREAS, The Fall of man into sin and God’s subsequent curse have introduced brokenness and futility into 
God’s good creation (Genesis 3:1–24; Romans 8:20)…
RESOLVED, That we oppose efforts to alter one’s bodily identity (e.g., cross-sex hormone therapy, gender 
reassignment surgery) to refashion it to conform with one’s perceived gender identity; and be it further
RESOLVED, That we continue to oppose steadfastly all efforts by any governing official or body to validate 
transgender identity as morally praiseworthy (Isaiah 5:20); and be it further
RESOLVED, That we oppose all cultural efforts to validate claims to transgender identity…. (Southern Baptist 
Convention 2014)
To be fair, the document did also extend compassion to transgender people, saying “That we love our 
transgender neighbors, seek their good always, welcome them to our churches and, as they repent and 
believe in Christ, receive them into church membership” and that “we regard our transgender neighbors as 
image-bearers of Almighty God and therefore condemn acts of abuse or bullying committed against them.” 
This indeed is admirable and loving. Feminist Blackness would have no qualms with this stance, as it largely 
affirms life. However, the quoted resolutions above nullify this act of compassion and discredit the validity 
of trans embodiment—trans humanity—on the basis of the divine. All traditional Christian gender roles are 
dichotomized and given divine origins, and deviations from those roles are seen as affronts toward god. We 
see the repeating of the common innate flaw in humanness (“The Fall of man into sin and God’s subsequent 
curse have introduced brokenness and futility into God’s good creation”), but this is supplemented with 
trans bodies being poster children for such brokenness. To oppose the refashioning of one’s body so that it 
is in accordance with one’s gender identity disqualifies trans people’s personal subjectivity and autonomous 
will in favor of god’s, a will that is used to justify hegemonic reign. The religious Convention also literally 
sees as praiseworthy the legal and cultural invalidation of transgender identity, which would otherwise 
discursively write trans humanity into law. 
It is thus necessary to (re)affirm the humanity of female and trans bodies. Through a radical feminist 
framework this can be fully accomplished.
Returning to Catherine Keller’s insight from the opening lines of this section, I have attempted to wrestle 
with the god concept and take seriously its implications. God occupies a vitally important place in the 
cultural discourse about justice, humanity, knowledge, and life, and therefore must be reckoned with if we 
are to take seriously the commitment to fighting for female, trans, and Black subjectivity and full humanity. 
By rejecting god and replacing the hole left by god with atheistic radical feminist Blackness, the stage is 
better set to affirm the life of those bodies that are most marginalized and subject to the dehumanizing, 
ontologically circumscriptive, and too-often murderous white gaze of the “transcendental signified,” that 
is, god. 
Notes
1. I use the word “god(s)” throughout instead of “God” for precisely the same reason as A. C. Grayling does. Grayling 
notes that 
Religious people of course use the word [god] as a name or proper noun. Such uses, even by nonreligious people, 
appear to imply or assume the existence of an entity thus named or referred to. The shorthand convenience of 
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this usage perpetuates the illusion that there is a genuine subject of discussion in hand, and prevents people from 
distinguishing between the existence of religions—whose existence is a sociological fact—and the existence of gods, 
goddesses and other supernatural entities which those religions assert to exist—whose existence is a creation of 
man’s imagination. If we used the phrases “gods and goddesses” or “supernatural agencies” when discussing what 
religious people believe exists, we would have a clearer view of the task that the debate addresses. (2014, 23)
It is for this reason that I do the same. Furthermore, “god” is not a proper name—it is a catchall for an invented type 
of being. It is akin to “people” as a general term, while “Jeff” and “Joanne” are proper names of particular people. So, 
too, is “god” like “people,” and “Yahweh (YHWH)” or “Allah” like the proper names of particular gods.
2. My seemingly peculiar way of redacting the common phrase “her or his” to read “her-through-his” is meant to 
acknowledge the nonbinariness of biological sex. To say “her or his” denotes only two sexes when in fact there are a 
multiplicity of sexes outside of the male/female binary, which we broadly classify as intersex. The characteristics or 
traits that are most often considered when determining the sex of a person include chromosomal makeup, presence of 
a womb, hormones, external genitalia, and whether the body has ovaries or testes. There are “girl-looking” bodies with 
male genes and internal structures, and vice versa; there are bodies born with ambiguous genitalia. These variations 
of sexual development (VSDs) dissolve the binary thinking of male and female; thus, in an effort to enact more inclu-
sive language, I connote the sex spectrum rather than the binary by using “her-through-his” (and also “male-through-
female,” “him-through-her,” etc.).
3. Drawn from Kuruvilla and Blumberg 2014. Parts of this section also appear in Bey 2016.
4. According to Rich Juzwiak and Aleksander Chan, from 1999 to 2014 at least seventy unarmed people of color have 
been killed by white police officers (Juzwiak and Chan 2014).
5. This is certainly not to diminish the efforts of religious leaders who have spoken out, namely those like Cornel 
West, who was himself arrested for protesting the Ferguson murder, and others  in Missouri. West in fact participated 
in Union Theological Seminary’s “Faith in Ferguson” rally and, during a discussion after the incident, said, “I didn’t 
come here to give a speech. I came here to go to jail.” Furthermore, religious leaders in Ferguson were named HuffPost 
Religion’s People of the Year. Since the day Mike Brown was killed, Ferguson’s religious leaders “acted as liaisons for 
conversations between protesters and the police, and in the most heated moments of protest created a human buffer 
that likely saved lives. One pastor even sustained a bloody bruise after being shot by a rubber bullet while praying be-
tween protesters and the police.” However, it remains that the religious support has largely been concentrated around 
Ferguson and other sites where Black victims were slain, and has as its forerunners Black churches. White religious 
leaders and congregants, especially white Evangelicals, express much backlash to notions of white privilege and racial 
disparities, and their numbers greatly surpass those who protest.
6. The idea of god as death is adapted from Hägglund’s atheistic interpretation of Derrida’s god in Hägglund 2008, 8.
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Hägglund, Martin. 2008. Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Hall, Stuart. 1990. “Cultural Identity and Diaspora.” In Identity: Community, Culture, Difference, edited by Jonathan 
Rutherford, 222–37. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
Harney, Stefano, and Fred Moten. 2013. The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study. Wivenhoe, NY: Minor 
Compositions.
Juang, Richard. 2006. “Transgendering the Politics of Recognition.” In The Transgender Studies Reader, edited by 
Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle, 706–19. New York: Routledge.
Juzwiak, Rich, and Aleksander Chan. 2014. “Unarmed People of Color Killed by Police, 1999-2014.” Gawker, Decem-
ber 8. http://gawker.com/unarmed-people-of-color-killed-by-police-1999-2014-1666672349?ncid=fcbklnkushp
mg00000047.
Keller, Catherine. 2000. “Christianity.” In A Companion to Feminist Philosophy, edited by Alison M. Jaggar and Iris 
Marion Young, 225–35. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Kuruvilla, Carol, and Antonia Blumberg. 2014. “‘Right Now Jesus Is Saying: I Can’t Breathe’ Religious Leaders React to 
Non-Indictment in Garner Case.” HuffPost Religion, December 3. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/03/
religious-reactions-eric-garner_n_6264266.html.
Journal of Feminist Scholarship, Vol. 9 [2018], Iss. 9, Art. 2
17Journal of Feminist Scholarship 9 (Fall 2015)
Lackey, Michael. 2007. African American Atheists and Political Liberation: A Study of the Sociocultural Dynamics of 
Faith. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
Leder, Drew, ed. 1992. The Body in Medical Thought and Practice. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Levi, Jennifer L. n.d. “Statement by Jennifer L. Levi, Esq. before the Joint Committee on Judiciary in Support of Raised 
Bill No. 5723. An Act Concerning Discrimination.” http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/advocacy/Testimony_CT_
Transgender_2008_03_18.pdf.
Oshinsky, David M. 1996. Worse than Slavery: Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of Jim Crow Justice. New York: Free 
Press.
The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. 2008. “U.S. Religious Landscape Survey. Religious Affiliation: Diverse and 
Dynamic.” http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf.
Pew Research Center. 2009. “A Religious Portrait of African-Americans.” January 30. http://www.pewforum.
org/2009/01/30/a-religious-portrait-of-african-americans/.
Pinn, Anthony B., ed. 2001. By These Hands: A Documentary History of African American Humanism. New York: 
New York University Press.
———. 2010. Embodiment and the New Shape of Black Theological Thought. New York: New York University Press.
Redmond, Eric C. 2008. Where Are All the Brothers? Straight Answers to Men’s Questions about the Church. Whea-
ton, IL: Crossway Books.
Rich, Jennifer. 2007. An Introduction to Modern Feminist Theory. Tirril: Humanities-Ebooks. 
Schaefer, Donovan. O. 2014. “Embodied Disbelief: Poststructural Feminist Atheism.” Hypatia 29 (2): 371–87.
Sharpe, Christina. 2014. “Black Studies: In the Wake.” The Black Scholar 44 (2): 59–69.
Slevin, Peter. 1998. “Suit over Bias in Rescue Goes to Trial; Attorney for Dead Transvestite’s Mother Says D.C. Workers 
Mocked, Mistreated Son.” The Washington Post, November 11.
Snorton, C. Riley, and Jin Haritaworn. 2013. “Trans Necropolitics: A Transnational Reflection on Violence, Death, and 
the Trans of Color Afterlife.” In The Transgender Studies Reader 2, edited by Susan Stryker and Aren Z. Aizura, 
66–75. New York: Routledge.
Southern Baptist Convention. 2014. “On Transgender Identity.” http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/2250/on-transgen-
der-identity.
Spillers, Hortense J. 2003. Black, White, and in Color: Essays on American Literature and Culture. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press.
Winter, Bronwyn. 2001. “Naming the Oppressor, Not Punishing the Oppressed: Atheism and Feminist Legitimacy.” 
Journal of Women’s History 13 (1): 53–57.
Yancy, George. 2008. Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Continuing Significance of Race. Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield.
Bey: She Had a Name
